A semantics is given to possibilistic logic, a logic that handles weighted classical logic formulae, and where weights are interpreted as lower bounds on degrees of certainty or possibility, in the sense of Zadeh's possibility theory. The proposed semantics is based on fuzzy sets of interpretations. It is tolerant to partial inconsistency. Satisfiability is extended from interpretations to fuzzy sets of interpretations, each fuzzy set representing a possibility distribution describing what is known about the state of the world. A possibilistic know ledge base is then viewed as a set of possibility distributions that satisfy it. The refutation method of automated deduction in possibilistic logic, based on previously introduced generalized resolution principle is proved to be sound and complete with respect to the proposed semantics, including the case of partial inconsistency.
INTRODUCTION
Possibilistic logic is a logic of uncertainty tailored for reasoning under incomplete information. At the syntactic level, it handles formulas of propositional or first-order logic to which lower bounds of degrees of necessity (i.e. certainty) or possibility are attached. The degrees of possibility follows the rules of possibility theory (Zadeh, 1978 ; and the degrees of necessity are defined from degrees of possibility through a classical duality relationship. A possibilistic knowledge base can thus be viewed as a stratified (or layered) classical knowledge base, where some formulae are more certain, or more possible than others. Resolution rules have been derived in accordance with the axioms of possibility theory Prade, 1987, 1990a ) and a refutation technique has been implemented for necessity-valued formulas (Dubois,Prade and Lang, 1987) further on extended to both possibility and necessity-valued formulas (Lang, 1991) . The main ideas behind possibilistic logic are : i) the degree attached to a proof path in a possibilistic knowledge-base is the least degree attached to a formula in this proof path, and the degree attached to a consequence of a possibilistic knowledge base is the greatest degree attached to proof paths yielding this consequence ; ii) when two antagonistic propositions p and --.p can be derived, the one with the highest degree inhibits the other one. The latter point indicates that possibilistic logic can handle partial inconsistencies. Moreover possibilistic logic proposes a way of handling uncertainty based on the idea of ordering rather than counting, contrary to probabilistic logic. This paper presents a semantics for possibilistic logic in a fairly general situation, i.e. possibility or necessity-valued clauses, and the presence of partial inconsistency, are allowed. It extends a previous semantics dedicated to necessity-valued propositional clauses only (Dubois et a!., 1989) . This semantics is based on an extension of the satisfiability notion from sets of interpretations to fuzzy sets of interpretations. The idea of a fuzzy set of interpretations is that some interpretations are preferred to others and enable non-trivial inferences that could not be made if interpretations were equally considered. In this sense, possibilistic logic belongs to the family of non monotonic logics based on preferential models, whose general setting has been devised by Shoham (1988) ; see Dubois and Prade (1991) on this point. Possibility distributions are viewed here as a convenient way of encoding a preference relation by attaching a weight to each interpretation of a set of formulas. Possibilistic logic completely contrasts with Ruspini (1991) 's so-called "fuzzy logic" where the semantics relies on the idea of similarity rather than ordering. Ruspini's logic is one of graded indiscernibility between worlds (in the spirit of Pawlak (1982) 's rough sets) while possibilistic logic is a logic of preference between interpretations.
Possibilistic logic is closely related to Shackle (1961) 's degrees of potential surprize, and Spohn (1988) 's ordinal conditional functions. See Dubois and Prade (1990b) on this latter point. Possibility measures can also be viewed as consonant belief functions (Shafer, 1976) . However, possibilistic logic is not a truth-functional many-valued logic and is not a logic of vagueness (as is fuzzy logic) because it primarily pertains to non-fuzzy propositions the truth of which is uncertain due to incomplete information.
In the next section, a language and a semantics are presented for possibilistic logic, a logic of necessity and possibility-valued (classical) formulas. A version of the semantics, in terms of a possibility distribution on a set of interpretations for the case of consistent knowledge bases is first presented, where consistency refers to the proper assignment of the possibility and necessity degrees (with respect to the axioms of possibility and necessity measures). A generalized semantics, where an extra element representing the absurd interpretation is added to the referential of the possibility distribution, is then introduced in order to allow for inconsistencies. Section 3 describes an automated deduction procedure based on extended resolution and refutation. Completeness of the deduction procedure holds, with respect to the proposed semantics.
POSSIBILISTIC LOGIC :
LANGUAGE AND SEMANTICS
LANGUAGE
A possibi/istic formula is either a pair (q> (N a)) where q> is a classical first-order formula and a E (0,1], (a should be StriCtly positive) or a pair (q> (fl �)) where� E [0,1].
(<p (N a)) expresses that <p is certain at least to the degree a, i.e. N(<p) �a, and (<p err �)) expresses that <p is possible at least to the degree �.i.e. IT(cp) ��.where rr and N are dual measures of possibility and necessity modelling our incomplete state of knowledge (Zadeh, 1978 ; . The right part of a possibilistic formula, i.e. (N a) or err �). is called the valuation of the formula, and is denoted val(<p).
The basic axiom of a possibility measure IT is fl( <p v <p') = max (IT( <p ),IT( cp')) (on a finite language ;£,-on which formulas are defined). Informally, fl(<p) = 0 means that <p is impossible while IT( <p) = I means that <p is consistent with current knowledge. Particularly fl(<p) = 0 when <p is a contradiction. The necessity measure N is defined as N(<p)= 1 -ITC�cp), and is such that N(<p 1\ <p') = min(N(<p),N(cp')). N(<p) = 1 means that <p is sure ; for instance N(<p) = 1 when cp is a tautology. Since V <p, N(<p v �cp) = 1, we only have N(<p v cp') � max(N(<p),N(<p')); indeed, for <p' = �cp, we may have N(cp) = N(�<p) = 0 (i.e. IT(cp) = IT(�cp) = 1). It can be shown that N(<p) � IT(cp), generally. More specifically, IT(cp) = 1 as soon as N(<p) > 1. This is due to the axioms that force IT(cp v �cp) = 1 = max(IT(<p),IT(�cp)). When fl(<p) = IT(�cp) = 1, we capture a state of ignorance about <p. Hence since we use lower bounds on possibility or necessity measures, various cases of relative ignorance can be captured ranging from the case where we know that we do not know (IT(<p) = rrc�cp) = 1) to the case where we do not know if we know err Ccp) � 0, TI(-,<p) � 0). Let CJ,f be the set of all possible valuations of possibilistic formulas. Since N(<p) > 0 entails TI(cp) = 1, and the valuations act as lower bounds, ( <p (N a)) is stronger than ( <p err �)) for any a > 0, � � 0 ; this leads us to define the following ordering among valuations :
Hence the maximal and minimal elements of o/ are respectively (N 1) (expressing that a formula is completely certain) and en 0) (corresponding to the strongest form of ignorance, since fl(<p) � 0 only). A possibilistic knowledge base is then defined as a finite set (a conjunction) of possibilistic formulae. ff"* will denote the set of classical formulae obtained from a set of possibilistic formulae fF, by ignoring the weights. A possibilistic formula whose valuation is of the form (N a) (resp. err a)) will be called a necessity-valued (resp. possibility-valued) formula. Let LP 1 (resp. LP2) denote the language consisting of only necessity-valued formulae (resp. where possibility-valued formulae are also allowed).
SEMANTICS UNDER CONSISTENCY
Let ;£,-be a classical language associated with the set ff"* of classical formulae obtained from a set fF of possibilistic formulae, and let Q be the set of (classical) interpretations for ;£,-. Let ;£,-' be the set of closed formulae of ;£,-.
Then we define a possibility distribution 1t as a mapping from Q to [0,1] such that 3 ro E Q, n(ro ) = 1 (normalization). This possibility distribution represents the description of an incomplete state of knowledge, such that n(ro) = 0 means that ro is forbidden while n(ro') > n(ro) means that ro' is an interpretation preferred to ro. The normalization constraint expresses the natural requirement that there should exist at least one fully possible interpretation in Q with respect to a consistent (possibly incomplete) state of knowledge. The possibility measure IT. induced (in the sense of Zadeh (1978) ) by the possibility distribution 1t is the function from ;£,-' to [0, 1] defined by V cp E ;£,-', IT(cp) = Sup(n(ro), ro F= <p} 1 where ro F= <p means "ro is a model of cp". The dual necessity measure N induced by 1t is defined by V <p E ;£,-', N(cp) = 1 -Il(-,cp) = Inf ( 1 -n(ro), ro F= -,cp} 1 . Then, it can be seen that expressing constraints of the form N(<p) �a or Il(cp) � � is equivalent to specify a set of possibility distributions over Q which are compatible with the corresponding possibilistic formulae. A possibility distribution 1t on Q is said to satisfy the possibilistic formula (<p (N a)), iff N(<p) �a, where N is the necessity measure induced by n. We shall then use the notation 1t F= (<p (N a)). In the same manner, we write 1t F= (<p err�)) iff Il(cp) ��.where IT is the possibility measure induced by n. Then, let fF = (<P i , i = l. .. n} be a set of possibilistic formulae <l> i =(<p i v i ) where <p i E ;£,-' and V i E o/; a possibility distribution 1t is said to satisfy ff", i.e. 1t F= ff", iff V i = 1, ... ,n, 1t satisfies <l> i . Then, a possibilistic formula <l> is said to be a logical consequence of the set of possibilistic formulae fF iff any possibility distribution satisfying fF also satisfies <l>, i.e. V 1t, (7t F= ff) ==> (1t F= <l>). 
It is then obvious that ff 1= (q (Il 0.8)). Indeed, any possibility distribution 1t satisfying ff is such that 1t ( [p, ql) � 0.8, and thus verifies fl
• It is worth noticing that in LP 1 there is an equivalence between the consistency of the classical set of formulae ff * and the existence of a greatest normalized possibility distribution 1t satisfying ff, as shown in (Dubois et al., 1989) . Indeed if 1t is normalized it can be easily checked that 'v'<p, min(N(<p) ,N(-,<p)) = 0 where N is defined from 1t; in other words it is impossible that there exists <p such that both <p and -,<p have a strictly positive lower bound for their necessity degrees (i.e. that both <p and -,<p appear in the deductive closure of ff*).
Our semantics is similar to Nilsson's (1986) probabilistic logic semantics. Indeed this author considers a set of probability distributions on the set of interpretations n, defining probability measures on the set of closed formulas � ', which are compatible with bounds constraining the probability of formulae in the knowledge base. The notions of logical consequences are similar in both approaches.
3 EXTENDING THE SEMANTICS TO PARTIAL INCONSISTENCIES
Let us first take an example let '() (ro) , co E Q) = I. This set of constraints being unsatisfiable (because of the normalization constraint), there is no possibility distribution over n satisfying '() , which comes down to say that y is inconsistent. As a consequence, any possibilistic formula is a logical consequence of y .
However, it would not be fully satisfactory to define a logic which handles degrees of uncertainty without allowing for degrees of (partial) inconsistency. Indeed, if we consider the above example where we suppose that p, q and r respectively express "the hostages will be freed" (p); "Peter is going to be the victim of an affair" (q) ; "Peter will be elected" (r) respectively. Then the formulas contained in ff express that it is moderate! y certain that if the hostages are freed then Peter will be elected, that it is almost certain that if Peter is victim of an affair then he will not be elected, that it is rather certain that the hostages are going to be freed and that it is weakly certain that Peter will be the victim of an affair. The inconsistency comes from the beliefs of the experts who gave the information stored in the knowledge base. However, the expert who gave the last formula was only weakly certain of what he said, so that the inconsistency should be relativized. Since the first three formula of'() are strictly more certain than the last one, we would like our logic to behave as if the set of formulas were only partially inconsistent, its inconsistency degree being the valuation of the weakest formula involved in the contradiction ; then, the deduction of a formula with a valuation strictly greater than this inconsistency degree should still be permitted ; since this deduction would involve only a consistent part of the knowledge base made here of the most certain pieces of information in the example, we should still be able to deduce (r (N 0.6)) non trivially; this is done in Section 3. However a conclusion deduced from a partially inconsistent knowledge base should be regarded as more brittle than what is derived from a consistent one.
We are now going to give a semantics which handles such partial inconsistencies. The problem with the first semantics is that according to the definition of possibility and necessity measures we have (if .l denotes the contradiction) : fl(.l) = Sup(1t(ro), OJ 1= .l} =Sup 0 = 0 and N(.l) = Inf{l -1t(CO), co I= -,.l) = 1 -Sup(1t (ro) , co E Q) = 0. Hence the solution requires that non-zero values for fl(.l) and N(.l) be allowed.
The solution we propose consists in adding to the set of interpretations Q an extra-element, noted OJ .l in which any formula is "true", i.e. V <p E �',co .Li= <p which corresponds to the idea of an "absurd interpretation" discussed by Stalnaker (1968) 
does not take ii(OJ_ L) into account, while n(<p) does ; 2 The idea of adding an extra-element to the referential of a possibility distribution has been already used for dealing with the case of an attribute which does not apply to an item of a data base. However the extensions of the possibility and necessity measures which are used for the evaluations of queries in incomplete information databases differ from the extensions defined here ; see chapter 6 of . particularly �(<p) = inf( l-it(ro), ro E Q, ro F= -,cp}, and �(.l) = 1-sup(it(ro), roE Q} ;:;: 0; note also that ro Fj= <p is no longer equivalent to ro F= -,cp, since ro _1_ F= <p and ro .l F= -,cp .
As it can be easily seen, we have N a)) , is now considered as meaning n(<p) <:: a (respectively �(<p) <:: a), i.e. we take into account the absurd interpretation in our understanding of expert statement. For instance, (<p (IT a)) expresses that "it is possible at least to the degree a that either <p is true or we are in an absurd situation". This leads us to the following definitions :
satisfaction : it � (<p (I1 a)) iff n(<p);:;: a; it � (<p (N a)) iff �(<p);:;: a, where nand � are the extended possibility and necessity measures induced by it ; it � fF iff it satisfies all formulae of fF ;
The inconsistency-tolerant semantics is more general than the first one we introduced. In the case of a consistent possibilistic knowledge base fF (i.e., there exists a possibility distribution 1t over Q satisfying fF according to the first semantics), then the two logical consequence relations F= and � are equivalent. This is no longer true if fF is inconsistent (this is the property we wished). For instance, let us consider again l'J = ((-,p v r (N 0.6)), (-,q v -,r (N 0.9)), (p (N 0.8)), (q (N 0.3)} which is inconsistent according to the first semantics ; then, according to the inconsistency-tolerant semantics, l'J is consistent since we can find a possibility distribution on Q _1_ satisfying l'J . For example the possibility distribution, fio defined by indeed it o � lJ but we do not have n o � (r (N 0.7) ).
Hence the new semantics is definitely more tolerant to inconsistencies than the former one. When a set of possibilistic formulae fF is inconsistent in the sense of the first semantics but not in the sense of the second, then we shall say that fF is partially inconsistent. As we are going to show it, we can distinguish between two different types of partial inconsistencies.
Let fF be a set of possibilistic formulae ; considering the possibility distributions on Q _1_ satisfying fF, three situations may occur : (i)
3 it � fF such that it( ro _]_) = 0 : in this case, fF is consistent in both semantics ; fF is then said to be completely consistent.
(ii) V it � fF, it(ro j_) > 0 but 3 it � fF such that Sup( it(ro ), ro * roj_) = I : then, for any it satisfying fF, we have n(_l_) = it(OO_j_) > 0 and �( _!_ ) = 1-Sup (it(ro), ro * ro_1_) = o. Thus fF induces a "possible inconsistency" (contradiction being possible to a strictly positive degree). The minimal value of n(_l_) = it(roj_) among the possibility distributions it on Q _!_ satisfying fF gives the inconsistency degree of fF. Let a= Inf( n(_l_), it � fF) ; then Incons(fF) = (I1 a). (iii) V it � fF, Sup( it (ro), ro * ro j_} < 1 (which entails that V it � fF, ne ro j_) = 1). In this case, for any it satisfying fF, we have n(_l_) = it(OO_j_) = 1 and 'd wE Q, n(w)::;; 1 -a 1 is due to n � ff'. Hence the inequality a 2': a 1 · Now let 1t be defined by it(w) = 1-a 1 if w 1= <fl 2 " <fl3··· "<fl n · w "'<OJ., n(w)::;; 1 -a i if w I= •<fl i · w "'w _!_· Because <fl 2 " <fl3··· "<fl n ;o'_l_, 3w, it(w) = 1-a 1 . and it� ff. Hencea=a 1 . ii) lncons(fF) = ([J /3). It is obvious that ff' contains at least one possibility valued formula. Let us show that it is unique. The inconsistency degree is now of the form :
under the constraints N(<p i );:,: a i , i = 1,m max( n (wJ . ). TI(<pj));:,: �j· j = m + 1, ... , n Since � > 0, 'd 7t � ff', 3k such that TI(<p k ) < � k · and Incons(ff') = � k for some � k · In order to minimize this value, let us maximize it over Q, so as to make the set ( j I TI(<pj) < �jl as small as possible. Let it be defined by n(w) = min{1 -a i , w I= •<fl i · w "'<O J .
}.
Clearly, it 1= {(<p i (N a i ) ), i = l,m}, 3 wE Q, it(w) = 1 (since there is no inconsistency among the N-valued formulas), and 'dn' , it ' � {(<p i (N a i ) ), i = 1,m} ==} 'd wE Q, it'(w)::;; it(w). The only parameter le ft is it ( w _1_ ). Let � k = max { �j I I1( <flj) < �j} where I1 is based on it . Note that the maximality of it over Q minimizes the number of (<flj (I1 �j)) with I1(<flj) < �j· Lastly, the following results are easy to prove (Lang, 1991) : If ff is a set of possibilistic formulae and w a valuation of 9f, let us note ff w = {(<p v), v 2': w} and ff w = { (<p v), v > w} ; then (i) ff � (<pw) iff ff w � (<pw)
(ii) If Incons(ff) = w, ff is � -equivalent to ff w and to ffw u ((_!_ w)}.
AUTOMATED DEDUCTION IN POSSIBILISTIC LOGIC
Two well-known automated deduction methods have been generalized to possibilistic logic : i) resolution (Dubois and Prade, 1990a) and ii) the Davis and Putnam semantic evaluation procedure for propositional logic (Lang, 1990 ).
Here we focus only on resolution for which we give soundness and completeness results.
CLAUSAL FORM
In order to extend resolution to possibilistic logic, a clausal form is first defined. A possibilistic clause is a possibilistic formula (c w) where c is a first-order or propositional clause and w is a valuation of 'V'. A possibilistic clausal form is a conjunction of possibilistic clauses. If a possibilistic formula fF contains only necessity-valued classical formulae, then there exists a clausal form G of fF such that Incons(G) = Incons(ff), which generalizes the result holding in classical logic about the equivalence between the inconsistency of a set of formulae and the inconsistency of its clausal form. Indeed possibilistic clausal form G of ff can be obtained by the following method: if ff = ((ljl i (N a i )), i= 1... n}, then put each IP i into clausal form, i.e. IPi = (V) "j (C i j) where C ij is a universally-quantified classical clause ; then (V) " i, j((C i j (N a i ))} is the possibilistic clausal form equivalent to fF 3 . If fF contains also possibility-valued formulae, then generally we cannot compute from fF a clausal form having the same inconsistency degree as fF, even in propositional possibilistic logic. For instance, the closest clausal form we can compute from ff =
checked that Incons(ff) = en a) whereas Incons(G) = (IT 0). This negative result comes from the non compositionnality of possibility measures for conjunction. Indeed (p "q e n a)) is much stronger than (pen a))" (q en a)), since (p 1\ q en a)) means ncr 1\ q) � a, i.e.
3 co E Q .l such that co 1= p " q and ii( co) � a, whereas (p en a)) 1\ (q en a)), means :leo, co' E Q .l SUCh that co 1= p, co' 1= q and ii(co) �a, ii(co') �a. This problem, also appears in modal logics (Farinas and Herzig, I988) and can be similarly solved in our framework by "coloring" the "IT" valuations. We denote respectively by CLPI (resp. CLP2) the language consisting in necessity valued clauses only (resp. necessity-and possibility-valued clauses).
2 POSSIBILISTIC RESOLUTION RULES
The following possibilistic resolution rule, between two possibilistic clauses (q W I ) and (c2 w2), has been established by Prade (1987, 1990) : (CJ w 1 ) (C2 w2) (R)
3 Indeed, N(r,i(Cij)) 2: a is equivalent to min;[N(C ij )) 2: a and thus to "' j [N(c; j ) 2: a]; fF is then equivalent to (N a;) )]]. i.e. "ij{ (Cij (N a;) )].
where R(q ,c2) is a classical resolvent of q and c2, and * is defined by
err a) * en �) = en 0).
The similarity between (R) and resolution patterns existing in modal logics has been pointed out ; see (Dubois and Prade, 1990) . The following result can be easily checked Proposition 2 (soundness of rule (R)) : let G be a set of possibilistic clauses, and C a possibilistic clause obtained by a finite number of successive applications of (R) to C ; then C �C. Proof: Then rule (R) is sound.
•
REFUTATION BY RESOLUTION
In this section we consider a set ff of possibilistic formulae (the knowledge base) and a formula ljl ; we want to know the maximal valuation with which ff entails <p, i.e. Val(ff,<p) =Sup (wE 9f, ff � (<p w)).
This request can be answered by using refutation by resolution, which is extended to possibilistic logic as follows : Refutation by resolution :
1. Put ff in clausal form C ; 2 . Put ljl in clausal form ; let CJ, ... , C m be the obtained clauses ; (N I)) , ... , (e n (N 1))} 4. Search for a proof of ( .l w) with w maximal , by repeatedly applying the resolution rule (R) from C'; 5. Val(fJ,<p) = w
When the knowledge base consists of both necessity valued and possibility-valued formulae, then since the transformation into clausal form is not complete (it does not preserve the inconsistency degree), we shall suppose that 5F is a set of possibilistic clauses ; in this case, This result allows us to compute Val(ff,<p) by proving the inconsistency of ff 1\ (-,<p (N 1)).
Note that in Proposition 3 we are not making use of resolution. The two following propositions relate the resolution procedure to the computation of the degree of inconsistency. Proposition 4 Soundness and completeness of refutation by resolution in LP 1 (Dubois, Lang and Prade, 1989) : let ff be a set of necessity-valued first-order formulae and C the set of necessity-valued clauses obtained from ff ; then the valuation of the optimal refutation by resolution from C (i.e. the greatest valuation of the obtained empty clause) is the inconsistency degree of ff.
Corollary : let <p be a classical formula and C' the set of possibilistic clauses obtained from ff u { (-,<p (N 1))) ; then the valuation of the optimal refutation by resolution from C' is Val(ff,<p). This corollary derives immediately from Propositions 3 and 4.
Prwosition 5 Soundness and completeness of refutation by resolution in propositional CLP2 : if C is a set of propositional necessity-or possibility-valued clauses, then the valuation of the optimal refutation by resolution from C is the inconsistency degree of ff.
Corollary : let <p be a classical formula and C' the set of possibilistic clauses obtained from C u { (-,<p (N 1))) ; then the valuation of the optimal refutation by resolution from C' is Val(C,<p). (Farinas and HeiZig, 1988) ).
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
We now give an illustrative example. Let C be the following knowledge base, concerning an election whose two candidates are Mary and Peter :
(-,Victim-of-an-affair(x) v -,Elected(x) (N 0.9)) We cannot find any refutation from C ; hence, C is consistent, i.e. Incons(C) = (Il 0). Let us now find the best possibility or necessity degree of the formula "Elected(Mary)". Let C'= C u {(-,Elected(Mary) (N 1))); then there exist two distinct refutations by resolution from C', which are:
(-, Elected (Mary) (N 1)) C3
------ it is moderately certain that Mary will be elected ; this degree (N 0.5) is maximal, i.e. Val (C, Elected(Mary)) = (N 0.5). Then, we learn that Mary is being the victim of an affair (which is a completely certain information). This leads us to update the knowledge base by adding to C the possibilistic clause C 8 : (Victim-of-an-affair(Mary) (N !)).
Let C 1 be the new knowledge base, C 1 = C u { C 8 } . Then, we can find a (N 0.5)-refutation from cl : C8 C7 C3 C4
------------- Hence ff 1 is partially inconsistent, with Incons (CJ) = (N 0.5). The refutation which had given N (Elected(Mary) � 0.5 can always be obtained from ff 1 but since its valuation is not greater than Incons(ff J). it has become a trivial deduction.
On the contrary, adding to fF 1 the possibilistic clause (Elected(Mary) (N 1)), we find this time a (N 0.9) refutation. And, since (N 0.9) > Incons(fF 1 ), we have the non-trivial deduction fF Elected(Mary) (N 0.9)), and it could be shown that we also have fF 1 � (Elected(Peter) (N 0.9)).
CONCLUSION
Possibilistic logic drastically differs from probabilistic logic since the former is based on the ideas of ordering and preference (only the ordering of numbers is used) while the latter is b � sed on _ the ideas of measure and counting. Possi _ biiistlc logic Is a logic of incomplete information that Is more robust than classical logic, because it is tolerant to inconsistency. Besides, as advocated elsewhere possibilistic logic is in full accordance with current theories of belief revision based on epistemic entrenchment (Dubois and Prade, 1990b) , and with the principles of non monotonic reasoning (Dubois and Prade, 1991) . One of the strength of possibilistic logic is that the proof methods in �lassical logic still apply, even in the presence of partial mconsistency, and keep all their power, as indicated by the completeness results of this paper. This is would not be the case with a similar probabilistic extension of logic. Moreover efficient strategies for refutation methods have also been implemented . Current applications of possibilistic logic include hypothetical reasoning (Dubois, Lang and Prade, 1990) , logic programming (Dubois, Lang and Prade, 1991) , the automated resolution of combinatorial optimization problems with bottleneck-like objective functions (Lang, 1991) and belief revision. Among topics for further research is the study of the links between the semantics presented here and the Kripke-like sem�ntics previously proposed for necessity and possibility measures by Dubois, Prade and Testemale (1988) . Another issue is to bridge the gap between possibilistic logic (especially the handling of possibility degrees (Il a) ) and the semantics proposed by Yager (1987) in default logic for defaults such as "if p is certain and q is possible then r ". It would require to allow for disjunctions of weighted formulas in the language.
